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As a blood crisis diminishes the
blood supply within the United States, it
is incumbent upon policy makers to find
a way to mitigate any further damage.
One notable solution is to further reduce
or eliminate the MSM deferral period.
Seventeen other countries have moved
away from such a deferral, and the
United States should join that growing
list. With proper planning and publicity,
an elimination of the deferral could
create an immediate jump in blood
donations and end the current crisis.
Men who have sex with men can
contribute to the ADVANCE study by
visiting its website and finding a location
near them. We should all do what we
can to end this blood crisis and expand
eligibility for blood donations. ■
Corey L. Gibbs is an LL.M. Candidate
in New York Law School’s Tax Program.

CIVIL LITIGATION notes
CIVIL LITIGATION NOTES
By Arthur S. Leonard

Arthur S. Leonard is the Robert F. Wagner
Professor of Labor & Employment Law
Emeritus at New York Law School.
U.S. SUPREME COURT – On March
30, 2022, the Supreme Court docketed a
petition for certiorari by the proponents
of California Proposition 8, which
voters approved in 2008 to amend the
California Constitution to overrule a
California Supreme Court marriage
equality decision issued earlier that year.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 21-1304.
The constitutionality of Proposition 8
was successfully challenged in Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that
Prop. 8 violated both the due process
and equal protection clauses of the 14th
Amendment, affirmed on other grounds,
sub nom Perry v. Brown, 667 F. 3d 1078
(9th Cir. 2012). The proponents filed a
cert petition, which was granted, only
for the Supreme Court to decide, 5-4,
that the proponents did not have standing
to appeal the trial court’s ruling when
official state defendants decided not
to appeal. See Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). Prior to the
trial in this case, Chief District Judge
Vaughn Walker announced his intention
to have the trial simulcast to various
courtrooms, as the district courtroom
in San Francisco was too small to
accommodate the enormous number of
people interested in attending, but the
proponents protested and eventually the
Supreme Court ruled against Walker’s
plan. Then he announced that he
intended to have a video recording made
of the trial for his own use and, when the
proponents protested again, he stated
on the record in open court that the
recording would not be made public but
instead would be preserved under seal.
Although the transcript of the trial was
public, the recording remains under seal.
At various times since the trial, various

attempts have been made to persuade
the district court judges assigned to this
case after Judge Walker retired (and
came out as gay) to unseal the video and
make it public were unsuccessful until
2020, when the district court granted
the request as ten years had passed
since the trial; the court authorized
availability of the video recording on
the internet, and a divided 9th Circuit
panel rejected proponents’ appeal on
grounds of standing, finding that the
proponents had failed to demonstrate
any tangible injury from the unsealing
of the video. The dissent argued that
intangible injury to reputation also
should count for standing purposes.
Now those of the proponents still intent
on keeping the video from public view
have asked the Supreme Court to step
in. The first question presented, going
to standing, is whether “the breach of
Judge Walker’s binding promise to
Petitioner, upon which they reasonably
and detrimentally relied, cognizably
injures them,” which could give them
standing to appeal the district court’s
order. The second question is “Whether
the video recordings that Judge Walker
solemnly promised Petitioners would
not be made public may now be ordered
publicly released over their objection.”
Charles Cooper, who was the lead
trial attorney for the Proponents (who
intervened to defend Proposition 8
when then-California Attorney General
Jerry Brown declined to do so), is the
lead attorney on this certiorari petition.
There is some irony to this, because
some years after the trial Cooper
attended the same-sex marriage of his
daughter, and indicated that although
he did not believe that the Constitution
requires the states to allow same-sex
couples to marry, he has no personal
objection to same-sex marriage.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 5TH
CIRCUIT – He keeps coming back
from Mexico, and they keep deporting
him. In Garcia v. Garland, 2022 WL
April 2022 LGBT Law Notes 23
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764077, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 6521
(5th Cir., March 14, 2022), the court
rejected petitioner’s claim that because
the Notice to Appear he received did
not specify the time and date of his
removal proceedings, he was entitled
to a do-over of the proceedings and the
BIA’s refusal to reopen the proceedings
was erroneous. The court notes that
he came to the U.S. in 1994, received
“voluntary administrative departure”
in 2001, returned to the U.S. “without
having been admitted or paroled,”
then sent a notice to appear in 2004
leading to an order of removal by an
Immigration Judge in 2007, which was
affirmed in 2008, he was deported in
2010, but he found his way across the
border without being formally admitted
yet again. According to Judge Stephen
A. Higginson’s opinion for the court,
the Notice to Appear in the current case,
which mentioned “a date to be set” and
“a time to be set” for the hearing was
sufficient to comply with regulations.
Petitioner’s second motion to reopen
alleged that “he was recently diagnosed
with HIV and was receiving antiviral
treatment.” He asserted that “country
conditions and his own personal
circumstances had changed since 2007
and that because of his diagnosis,
he would be perceived as a member
of the LGBT community and would
accordingly face a substantial risk of
persecution and/or torture on account
of his membership in the particular
social groups of: (1) ‘homosexuals in
Mexico (imputed),’ (2) ‘individuals
in Mexico who are HIV positive’; and
(3) ‘HIV positive men in Mexico’”.
The Board of Immigration Appeals
denied this petition to reopen as well.
The BIA found no change in country
conditions during the specified time
and no evidence sufficient to support
asylum or withholding claims based
on his described social groups. “Garcia
has not carried his burden here,” wrote
Judge Higginson. “In support of his
argument that he has shown changed
country conditions, Garcia says that
24 LGBT Law Notes April 2022

he submitted the 2007 and 2018 State
Department County Reports on Mexico
in his motion to reopen and points out
that the 2018 report mentions violence
targeting LGBT persons in its preamble
while the 2007 preamble does not.” But
the court asserted that “comparison of
the preambles of the reports is not a
‘meaningful comparison’ between the
country conditions at both times . . .
and Garcia has not provided evidence
that the reports themselves show more
than the continuation of a trend of
discrimination and violence against
LGBT individuals in Mexico. Nor does
the 2019 report contain information
specific to the treatment of HIV positive
individuals.” The court also said that
other documents Garcia submitted were
no more helpful to his case. But the real
issue from Garcia’s perspective is that
his situation has change with his HIV
diagnosis, but, said the court, “a change
of personal circumstances cannot alone,
without further support from other
changed conditions, qualify as changed
country conditions.” Here is an example
of rigid bureaucratic thinking – perhaps
induced by a literalistic reading of the
statute and regulations. But this seems
to be the nature of our refugee laws: even
if a realistic assessment of current facts
would support a conclusion that sending
a particular person back to his home
country at this time would place him in
danger, that is essentially irrelevant to
the issue whether the agency abused its
discretion in finding based on the record
before it that petitioner had not sustained
his burden of showing changed country
conditions in order to justify reopening
his case. The court concluded that
because the petitioner had failed to
show that the BIA abused its discretion
in denying his motion to reopen his case,
the court would not “reach his claims
concerning his eligibility for asylum
and withholding of removal. Petitioner
is represented by Naimeh Salem of
Houston, TX. If he is removed again,
is there any doubt he will attempt to
return if physically able to do so? Judge

Higginson was appointed by President
Barack Obama.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 9TH
CIRCUIT – Tempest in a teapot, or
serious 1st Amendment matter? In Riley’s
American Heritage Farms v. Elsasser,
2022 WL 804108 (9th Cir., March 17,
2022), a 9th Circuit panel decided that
a serious 1st Amendment issue – that
could not be determined on summary
judgment – had been raised by James
Patrick Riley, the operator of Riley’s
American Heritage Farms and a person
willing to tweet controversial right-wing
views. Riley claims that the Claremont
Unified School District put his business
providing
historical
reenactments
for tourists and school groups on its
banned list in retaliation for some of
his tweets about which the District
received complaints from one parents
and another member of the public.
Every year from 2001 to 1017, several
classes from various elementary schools
in the District took field trips to Riley’s
American Heritage Farms. In August
2018, Mr. Riley, the proprietor, using
his individual Twitter account, posted
comments that would be offensive to
some people, about Senator Elizabeth
Warren, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand,
Black Lives Matter, and gender
diversity. After a parent complained
to a teacher and suggested the district
should not send field trips to Mr. Riley’s
establishment, the matter ascended to
supervisory levels and the word went
out to the District Schools to think about
alternatives to Riley’s establishment, as
a result of which field trips to Riley’s
were cancelled. A local newspaper
reported about the controversy that
Riley’s posts had stimulated on
Twitter and Facebook. Riley’s lawyer,
Thomas Eastmond, sent a letter to
James Elsasser, the superintendent
of the School District, as well as to
various board members, alleging that
an unconstitutional policy banning
field trips to Riley’s in retaliation for
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his tweets should be rescinded. The
District disclaimed having a formal
policy; its position was that having been
advised of Riley’s tweets, principals
and teachers decided against the field
trips. Is there a First Amendment issue
here? Riley thought so and filed suit.
The district court dismissed the School
District as a defendant on sovereign
immunity grounds, but litigation
continued against the Superintendent
and some board members. The district
court decided that these defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity as
to monetary damages. But Riley was
most interested in prospective injunctive
relief, which would not be barred by
immunity. However, former President
Trump’s least favorite district judge,
Jesus G. Bernal, concluded that there
was no evidence that the defendants
had a “policy” prohibiting future field
trips to Riley’s, so there was no need
for injunctive relief. The 9th Circuit
panel, in an opinion by Judge Sandra S.
Ikuta, joined by Judges Mark J. Bennett
and Ryan D. Nelson, found that under
9th Circuit precedents Riley and his
establishment should be treated as the
equivalent of government employees for
First Amendment purposes, meaning
that the Supreme Court’s Pickering
balancing test should be used to
determine whether the government’s
concerns outweighed the Plaintiff’s 1st
Amendment rights. The court found
that there is a genuine issue of material
fact whether the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights have been violated;
although the individual defendants
enjoy qualified immunity against
monetary damages because the court
could find no controlling precedent on
point to this fact pattern, on the issue of
prospective injunctive relief, “there is a
genuine issue of material fact whether
the school officials are maintaining
an unconstitutional, retaliatory policy
barring future patronage to the vendor.”
Judge Ikuta was appointed by President
George W. Bush. Judges Bennett and
Nelson were appointed by President

Donald J. Trump. As such, the panel
is not representative of the majority
ideological balance on the 9th Circuit,
where 18 active judges were appointed
by Presidents Clinton, Obama and Biden,
while 13 active judges were appointed
by Presidents G.W. Bush and Trump.
Perhaps an en banc petition may change
the result in this case. As Judge Ikuta
noted, there is no 9th Circuit controlling
precedent on the 1st Amendment issue
as resolved by the panel in this opinion,
which is why the individual defendants
enjoy qualified immunity from the
damages claim.
CALIFORNIA – In Randall v. Automatic
Data Processing, Inc., 2022 WL
843460, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51639
(C.D. Calif., March 21, 2022), Thomas
Randall, a California resident who is a
gay man, sued his former employer and
his former supervisor for discrimination
because of age and sexual orientation,
failure to prevent discrimination and
harassment, and wrongful termination
in violation of public policy. All of
Randall’s claims are stated solely under
state law, but the employer removed
the case to federal court on diversity
grounds, noting that it is not a resident
of California for jurisdictional purposes.
Randall did not want to be in federal court
and moved to remand the case, claiming
that because his supervisor, Wendy
Heesch, was a California resident, there
was not complete diversity between the
parties, so the case was not removable.
ADP objected that Heesch was a “sham”
defendant, and her citizenship should be
disregarded for purposes of diversity.
At a hearing on the contested remand
motion, ADP asserted that the facts
alleged by Randall against Heesch were
insufficient to state a claim against her.
Randall, disagreeing, claimed that he
could allege additional claims and facts
if he was granted leave to amend. The
court granted leave and Randall filed
an Amended Complaint, adding two
additional causes of action: harassment

based on age, sexual orientation and
marital status in violation of the
California Fair Employment and
Housing Act, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. These claims
arose out of the common nucleus of
facts alleged in the discrimination claim
against the company. District Judge
John W. Holcomb found that the facts
alleged were sufficient under California
law to state a claim against Heesch, and
granted Randall’s motion to remand
the case to state court, but denied
Randall’s request for attorneys’ fees
for representation in opposition to the
removal motion. Randall is represented
by Mark Shipman Stiffler, Donald R.
Holben, Paul H. Duvall, and Nia K.
Perkinsm, of Donald R. Holben and
Associates APC, San Diego, CA. Judge
Holcomb was appointed by President
Donald J. Trump.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA – Janice
Coclough was employed by Akal
Security, Inc., to work as a Court
Security Officer under its contract
providing security for the federal
courthouses in the District of Columbia.
She is a lesbian but was not out at
work, and kept her sexual orientation
a secret. Nonetheless, she claims there
were rumors about her and that she
was perceived as gay by court security
workers and court officials. She was
discharged by Akal after the U.S.
Marshall service sent them a written
demand to remove her from working
in the court where she was assignment.
She claimed that her discharge by Akal
was in retaliation for sexual harassment
complaints she had made, and that
Akal could have transferred her to
another assignment. Akal presented
evidence that Coclough as the subject
of various complaints by coworkers
alleging that she was subjecting other
employees to a hostile environment.
Her lawsuit asserted violations of Title
VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act by
her employer, and she asserted claims
April 2022 LGBT Law Notes 25
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against her former supervisors under
the D.C. Human Rights Act. Chief U.S.
District Judge Beryl A. Howell granted
the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and the plaintiff’s motion to
seal certain exhibits she had submitted
in response to defendants’ motion. The
opinion in Coclough v. Akal Security,
2022 WL 768469, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43693 (D.D.C., March 13, 2022),
focuses first on problems occasioned
by the submission of heavily redacted
documents by plaintiff in opposition
to defendants’ motion, which the
court found should have been handled
differently by plaintiffs’ counsel. As
a result, the redacted documents were
virtually useless to the court in fulfilling
its role of determining whether there
were disputed issues of material fact
that would prevent a grant of judgment
as a matter of law. The court’s solution
was to limit the factual assertions by
the plaintiff in opposition to the motion
to those made during the discovery
process that were thus part of the record
accessible to the court. Ultimately,
Judge Howell concluded that plaintiff
was misconstruing the options open to
her employer when it received a written
communication from the U.S. Marshall’s
Office to take her off the contract which
governed the security for the courts, and
furthermore, as far as a perceived sexual
orientation claim went, the defendants
had presented well documented claims
of misconduct by the plaintiff in her
treatment of co-workers that provided
legitimate grounds for its action. The
opinion is long and detailed concerning
the factual allegations of both sides and
may make interesting reading, but does
not merit extended treatment here on
questions of law. Plaintiff is represented
by Darrell Chambers, Silver Spring,
MD, and Douglas Stuart Rosenbloom,
Takoma Park, MD. Judge Howell was
appointed by President Barack Obama.
HAWAI’I – According to U.S. District
Judge Jill A. Otake, ruling on dismissal
26 LGBT Law Notes April 2022

motions in Scutt v. UnitedHealth
Insurance Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45445, 2022 WL 787992 (D. Haw.,
March 15, 2022), this case is one of ten
cases that Jason Scutt, a transgender
woman, has filed pro se “pertaining
to her dissatisfaction with transgenderrelated medical care and health insurance
coverage.” This particular complaint
focuses on whether Scutt’s rights were
violated in the matter of transportation
services she needed in connection with
her gender reassignment procedures.
She alleges that “she was unable to
utilize transportation services because
LogistiCare and UHC would not
communicate via email or text message
to accommodate her hearing loss and
tinnitus, and that she could not equally
benefit from these services due to her
hearing problems and body/gender
dysphoria.” Judge Otake confronted
defendants’ argument that “gender/
body dysphoria” is not a disability
within the meaning of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), which
specifically excludes from coverage
“gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments.” The court
noted that “courts have yet to settle the
question of whether gender dysphoria
results from physical impairments,
thereby excepting it from the foregoing
exclusion, and the answer is not as clear
cut as LogistiCare and UHC suggest,”
citing Doe v. Penn. Dep’t of Corr.,
2021 WL 1583556 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19,
2021), but decided that the court did
not have to rely on this ground for ADA
coverage because there was no doubt
that Scutt’s hearing impairment would
count as a disability. The court found
no connection between “body/gender
dysphoria” and the transportation
issues raised by the complaint, as the
accommodation problem concerned the
hearing impairment! After determining
that the transportation services at issue
come under the public accommodation
provision of the ADA, the court
concluded that Scutt had “sufficiently”
alleged denial of public accommodations

because of a disability and rejected the
motion to dismiss as to this claim. But
the court dismissed a “common rule”
claim under state law, as well as a Title
VI claim. State law claims of medical
malpractice and defamation were also
dismissed. The complaint lacked the
factual allegations necessary to ground
diversity jurisdiction over those claims.
Since the federal court’s jurisdiction
thus depended on Scutt’s ADA claim,
the court focused on whether these other
claims could remain in the case under
supplemental jurisdiction, and found that
they fell outside the nucleus of operative
facts in the federal claim, and thus
must be dismissed. The defendants also
sought to have the entire case dismissed
for Scutt’s failures to comply in every
detail with the magistrate judge’s orders
in this case, but, wrote Judge Otake,
“the Court declines to exalt form over
substance. The Court must liberally
construed pro se pleadings and ‘a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,” citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89 (2007). But the court reminded
Scutt that she “must comply with all
statutes, rules, and orders and her failure
to do so may result in the imposition of
sanctions, including but not limited to
dismissal.” The court rejected Scutt’s
request for permission to amend the
complaint to add both an Affordable
Care Act claim and additional factual
allegations to persuade the court that her
gender dysphoria should be considered
a disability. Judge Otake was appointed
by President Donald J. Trump.
ILLINOIS – In Brownlee & Fleming v.
Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of
Chicago, 2022 WL 602652, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 35640 (N.D. Ill., March 1,
2022), U.S. District Judge Franklin U.
Valderrama issued a lengthy amended
opinion working his way through
the defendants motion for summary
judgment on a plethora of claims
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arising under Title VII and the Illinois
Gender Violence Act and tort law. (The
original opinion sparked a motion for
reconsideration by the Archdiocese,
which caused the court to issue an
amended opinion.) The two plaintiffs,
Esther Brownlee and Joanie Fleming,
were employed as outreach workers by
Catholic Charities providing emergency
services to homeless and at-risk people
in Chicago. They asserted claims based
mainly on allegations of harassment by
a male co-worker and by a contractor of
the employer, alleged flaws in the way
their complaints were dealt with, and
retaliation claims as well. The Law Notes
connection here relates to Fleming,
a lesbian married to another woman,
but the decision does not focus in any
significant way on her sexual orientation,
so we will not go into great detail on this
lengthy opinion. As to Fleming’s claims,
the court granted defendants’ summary
judgment motion on Title VII sexual
harassment regarding the contractor’s
alleged conduct and a retaliation claim,
but denied the motion regarding sexual
harassment by the co-worker. Those
interested in the excruciating details are
referred to the published opinion as cited
above. The plaintiffs are represented by
Uche O. Asonye and Renee Christine
Fell, Asonye & Associates, Chicago,
IL. Judge Valderrama was appointed by
President Donald J. Trump.
ILLINOIS – In Ortiz v. Foxx, 2022 WL
991965, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61121
(N.D. Ill., March 31, 2022), U.S. District
Judge John F. Kness ruled that the
federal district court lacked jurisdiction
over litigation by a group of transgender
plaintiffs seeking a declaration that
a provision of Illinois’ name-change
statute was unconstitutional. The
statute provides that a State’s Attorney
may react to the filing of a namechange petition by a person who has
been convicted of a felony, certain sex
crimes, or an identity-theft offence
by requiring the petitioner to update

their criminal history transcript and by
filing an objection to the name change
petition. The plaintiffs sued Cook
County State’s Attorney Kimberly M.
Foxx and two Cook County state court
judges, seeking that the court order them
not to enforce this provision, since all
the plaintiffs come within its scope and
have been deterred from filing name
change petitions reflecting their gender
transition because of the provision. In
granting defendants’ motion to dismiss,
Judge Kness explained that contrary to
the allegation in plaintiffs’ complaint,
the statute does not prohibit name
changes for any group of people, but
instead authorizes the State’s Attorney
to require updating of records and to
advocate that a change not be granted,
leaving the decision in the hands of the
state court judge. Judge Kness noted the
defendants’ 11th Amendment sovereign
immunity argument, but ultimately
granted the dismissal motion based
on lack of standing of the plaintiffs –
none have applied for a name change
and none have been turned down –
and specifically noting, as well, that
the judicial defendants enjoy judicial
immunity. Plaintiffs argued that in
name change cases the judges would
be acting in an administrative capacity
rather than a judicial capacity and thus
would not enjoy immunity, but Judge
Kness disagreed, finding that the judges
are acting in their judicial capacity when
ruling on petitions for name changes,
as the statute leaves it up to the judges
to decide whether to deny a petition
due to the objection of the State’s
Attorney. Plaintiffs are represented by
the Transformative Justice Law Project
of Illinois, Chicago, IL; and Alexandra
Joelle Block, Brian D Straw, Martin S.
Kedziora, Gregory Edward Ostfeld, of
Greenberg Traurig LLP, Chicago, IL.
Judge Kness was appointed by President
Donald J. Trump.
INDIANA – “John Doe” is a
transgender man who is married to a

cisgender woman, A.B. John Doe is the
stepparent but not the adoptive parent
of A.B.’s children, R.M. (son) and J.M.
(daughter). John Doe kicked R.M. out
of the house for various reasons, and
R.M. ended up couch-surfing for a
while with other adults. A case manager
for the Indiana Department of Social
Services advised law enforcement, and
a detective arrested John Doe and A.B.
for child abandonment. R.M. informed
the detective that John Doe was a
transgender person whose former name
was Barbara. In this case, John Doe and
A.B. v. Gray, 2022 WL 602919, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 35568 (N.D. Ind., March
1, 2022), they claim that Gray and the
case manager shared this information
with the IDSS case worker and others,
including A.B., A.B.’s sister, and foster
parents with whom A.B. and J.M.
were placed. The suit claims that Gray
violated 14th Amendment privacy rights,
4th Amendment unreasonable seizure
(the arrest), and intentionally inflicted
emotional distress under Indiana tort
law. Plaintiffs claim that prior to the
disclosures by Detective Gray and
the case worker, neither A.G., nor her
children or her sister (and of course
not the foster parents) knew that John
Doe was identified as female at birth
lacked male genitalia – the information
disclosed by Gray and the case worker.
U.S. District Judge Damon R. Leichty
granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants, finding that “no reasonable
jury could find for John Doe and
A.B.” While conceding that a privacy
argument could be made, in this case
both defendants are public officials, so
qualified immunity shelters them from
liability unless they violated a clearly
established constitutional right. Judge
Leichty found that it was not clearly
established in binding case law that a
constitutional right of privacy would
protect against disclosure of knowledge
about a person’s gender identity in a
case such as this, and that based on the
evidence in record concerning the state
of Detective Gray’s knowledge when he
April 2022 LGBT Law Notes 27
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made the arrest for child neglect, it was
supported by probable cause. The court
rejected this argument by plaintiffs:
“John Doe and A.B. also claim that
there is a ‘clear trend in the caselaw that
[the court] can say with fair assurance
that the recognition of the right by a
controlling precedent was merely a
question of time,” relying on such cases
as Lawrence v. Texas, U.S. v. Windsor,
and Obergefell v. Hodges. “Though a
case directly on point is not required for
a right to be clearly established,” wrote
Judge Leichty, “this generalized trend
toward recognizing rights for samesex relationships is not tailored to the
disclosure of private information and
does not demonstrate that a sufficient
consensus had been reached on the
right to keep one’s sexual preference or
gender identity private from disclosure
to family or foster parents by state
authorities during an investigation.” The
plaintiffs are represented by Russell W.
Brown, Jr., of King Brown & Murdaugh
LLC, Barrister Court, Merrillville,
IN. Judge Leichty was appointed by
President Donald J. Trump.
KENTUCKY – Does Kentucky’s Civil
Rights Act (KCRA), which does not
expressly forbid discrimination because
of sexual orientation but does ban sex
discrimination, give rise to sexual
orientation discrimination claims as a
matter of statutory interpretation? Ruling
on a motion to dismiss a diversity case,
U.S. District Judge David J. Hale finds it
appropriate to deny a motion to dismiss
an employee’s claim that she suffered
retaliation because she opposed sexual
orientation discrimination, in Cimbalo
v. BASF Corporation, 2022 WL 696798,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40575 (W.D.
Ky, March 8, 2022). Kerry Cimbalo
was hired to oversee human resources
at BASF’s Quincy, Florida, worksite.
She brought to management’s attention
allegations that the manager at the
site “was demonstrating racial, sexual
orientation and gender hostility.” When
28 LGBT Law Notes April 2022

her supervisor didn’t follow up on her
complaint, she contacted the Kentuckybased legal department, which began
an investigation or her report, but the
company terminated her for “violating
a company guideline.” She claimed that
white male employees who received
warnings for “more serious violations”
had not been terminated. She sued in
state court alleging a violation of the
KCRA, and the company removed
to federal court citing diversity of
citizenship. The company’s dismissal
motion alleged, among other things, that
retaliation based on opposition to sexual
orientation discrimination was not
actionable because the KCRA does not
ban sexual orientation discrimination.
Judge Hale found that Kentucky courts
have followed Title VII precedents in
construing the KCRA, and that federal
diversity cases upon which the company
relies predate the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), interpreting
Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination
to
include
sexual
orientation
discrimination claims. The stated
legislative purpose of the KCRA is “to
provide for execution within the state of
the policies embodied in . . . Title VII,”
citing Ky. Rev. Stat. Sec. 344.020(1)
(a). “The Supreme Court’s decision in
Bostock and Kentucky courts’ reliance
on federal law when interpreting the
KCRA support a finding at this stage
in the litigation that the KCRA protects
individuals from discrimination based
on sexual orientation,” wrote Judge Hale.
Thus, “opposing” such discrimination
comes under the protection of the antiretaliation provision of the statute. The
court also rejected other arguments by
the employer, denying the company’s
motion to dismiss both the original
and the amended complaints on these
grounds. Cimbalo is represented by
Thomas Robert Coffey and John
Morgan McGarvey, of Morgan Pottinger
McGarvey-Louisville, Louisville, KY.
Judge Hale was appointed by President
Barack Obama.

KENTUCKY – Chief U.S. District Judge
Greg N. Stivers granted the employer’s
motion for dismissal or summary
judgment in Thomas v. Haaland, 2022
WL 801284, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45573 (W.D. Ky, March 15, 2022).
The judge was dealing with a pro se
complaint that went through three
rounds of amendment, by a heterosexual
man claiming his termination as a
Visitor Use Assistant at a national park
violated his rights under Title VII and
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
court found that the complaint failed to
allege actionable discrimination against
the plaintiff for being heterosexual
or having a disability. The defendant
asserted that plaintiff was discharged
because of his conduct which had
alarmed a visitor to the park, and the
court found that the complaint did
not allege facts that would support an
inference that his dismissal was due to
his sexual orientation as a heterosexual
man. Judge Stivers was appointed by
President Barack Obama.
LOUISIANA – In Henderson v. Board
of Supervisors of Southern University,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52279, 2022 WL
875592 (M.D. La., March 23, 2022), a
suit alleging that a high school senior
was subjected to student-on-student
harassment because of his sexual
orientation and the school violated
Title IX by an inadequate response to
the situation was dismissed without
prejudice by U.S. District Judge John
W. deGravelles, who allowed the
plaintiff 28 days to file an amended
complaint if the necessary additional
facts could be alleged sufficient to meet
pleading requirements as specified in
the opinion. In a footnote, the judge
remarked that the defendants were not
disputing that harassment based on
sexual orientation could be actionable
under Title IX., citing Bostock and
the Biden Administration’s indication
that all federal sex discrimination
laws should be construed consistently
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with the Supreme Court’s ruling that
discrimination because of sexual
orientation is covered by all federal
sex discrimination laws. In addition to
the harassment claim, plaintiff asserted
that the student, J.T., suffered retaliation
for complaining about the harassment,
that his equal protection rights were
also violated by the treatment of his
situation by school officials, and that
his 1st Amendment free speech rights
were violated when he was punished
for a verbal altercation with a teacher
about a month later. The judge’s opinion
methodically addresses each claim,
laying out the 5th Circuit precedents
for proof and specifying how the
complaint fell short, usually in terms
of factual specificity. After the school
gave J.T. approval to graduate early,
another student added him to the senior
class group text, and the complaint
alleges that “almost immediately” his
classmates “sexually harassed J.T. by
sending derogatory remarks in reference
to his sexual orientation” on the text,
characterizing this as “cyberbullying.”
However, wrote the judge, pleading a
harassment case requires more than
asserting conclusions. The complaint
lacks specifics. What were the
derogatory remarks? How many were
there? How frequent were they? After
school officials were notified by J.T.,
the assistant principal told one of the
students involved, who “threatened
J.T.,” but exactly how he was threatened
was unstated. J.T. was then removed by a
student from the senior class group text
as a result of which he alleges he was
excluded from senior class activities. The
verbal altercation with a teacher which
led to his discipline occurred a month
later, and once again the complaint is
not specific about the altercation and
asserted that J.T. suffered discrimination
without specifying how his treatment
differed from other similarly situated
students. Those interested in full details
of the court’s analysis should consult the
opinion. Civil pleading requirements as
applied in the 5th Circuit (and pursuant to

the Supreme Court’s Iqbal and Twombly
decisions, demand sufficient factual
specificity in complaints to support
all the elements of the cause of action,
not just a conclusory assertion. The
constitutional claims in the complaint
were added to try to get at the school
director and the assistance principal
on individual claims, since only the
school itself can be sued under Title
IX. The court held that the individual
defendants could not be sued in their
official capacities on these claims,
only in their individual capacities, and
that the complaint failed to show that
they had violated a well-established
constitutional right based on the factual
allegations of the complaint and thus
they enjoyed qualified immunity from
individual liability. However, as noted,
the court gave the plaintiff four weeks
to file an amended complaint. The suit
was filed by J.T.’s mother on his behalf.
Representing the plaintiff are Jill L
Craft and William Brett Conrad, Jr., of
Ms. Craft’s firm in Baton Rouge, LA;
and Kaitlin Aubrey Wall, of Erlingson
Banks, PLLC, also of Baton Rouge, LA.
Judge deGravelles was appointed by
President Barack Obama.
MARYLAND – For an extensive tale of
woe and an unhappy ending (dismissal
of the case), see Carter v. Bowie State
University, 2022 WL 717043, 2022
U.S. Dist. Lexis 42650 (D. Md., March
9, 2022). Tavion Carter, an African
American gay man, grew up in Las
Vegas, raised by a single mother. He
says he was basically on his own once
he was 17, and moved to Maryland when
he was 20 after his mother was sent to
prison. He was essentially homeless
and moved into a shelter as he was
finally coming to grips with his sexual
orientation. He applied to Bowie State,
a historically black university, and
managed to secure university-connected
housing having found shelter life too
dangerous for a gay black youth, and
having found difficulty in getting to his

classes via public transit, as he did not
have a car. He fell in love with another
student who also lived in the university
housing, his first real gay relationship,
but it turned out his new partner was
HIV positive and infected him, which
he claims “completely upended” his life,
and especially his hopes to join Bowie’s
football team, since the school doctor
who diagnosed him told him he would
be disqualified on medical grounds. He
confided in the V.P. for Student Affairs,
who had been sympathetic in finding
him housing, for which he had applied
late. His relationship with the other
student collapsed in raucous arguments
in the university housing, and he was
required to go to counseling. Then after
police raided the suite in which he was
living with several other students and
found marijuana (which he asserts did
not belong to him and which he had
never used), he lost his housing and was
suspended from school by order of the
same V.P. in whom he had confided. He
pursued his case through the school’s
appellate
process
unsuccessfully.
Although he was eventually allowed to
resume attending classes, he was barred
from the housing. These experiences
adversely affected his grades. He claims
that “none of the other people involved
in actually smoking marijuana were put
out of their student housing” and that
“none of the other roommates or other
students involved were suspended from
school as a result” of the marijuana raid.
He also claimed that he was the “only
student who lived in this CMRC room
who was known to be homosexual” and
“the only student who had HIV.” He
claims he was expelled from the housing
and barred from returning, even to get
his HIV meds, and was “the only student
suspended as a result of the incident.”
He claims violations of Title IX and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as well
as state law claims, asserting generally
that the people involved with making
these decisions knew he was gay and
HIV-positive, and that the V.P. had not
taken steps to protect his interest or
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advise him of his legal rights. He was
granted in forma pauperis standing on
the lawsuit. Although counsel is listed
on this opinion dismissing his case, the
loss seems to be attributed largely to
failure to plead facts sufficient to state
a claim under either statute, and part
of the opinion is devoted to dismissing
supplementary state law claims on
sovereign immunity grounds and also
claims against individuals, as the civil
rights statutes in question only run
against the school, not individuals. He
won a symbolic victory in defeating the
defendant’s claim of untimely service,
the court noting that while his petition to
proceed in forma pauperis was pending,
his time for serving the defendant with
his complaint was tolled. Ultimately,
the court concluded that his factual
allegations were insufficient to plead
discrimination and retaliation claims
against Bowie State. Counsel listed
on the opinion is Wanda J. Dixon of
Largo, MD. Judge George J. Hazel was
appointed by President Barack Obama.
MARYLAND – Alusine Conteh, an
immigrant from Sierra Leone, was
employed as a protective security
officer by two companies, Diversified
Protection Corporation (DPC) and
Triple Canopy, Inc. (TCI), working
at one location in Silver Spring MD
and another in White Oak MD. His
supervisor was the same man employed
by both companies, Alan Patterson, and
Patterson reported to the same director at
both worksites. In Conteh v. Diversified
Protection Corporation, 2022 WL
874937, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53182
(D. Md., March 24, 2022), U.S. District
Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby granted the
employers’ motion to dismiss Conteh’s
perceived sexual orientation and national
origin discrimination claims, as well
as hostile environment and retaliation
claims against DPC, but allowed a
discrimination claim to go forward
against TCI. Judge Griggsby found
that in the claim against TCI, Conhet
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alleged that a co-worker “continuously
subject [him] to national origin-based
and perceived sexual orientation-based
discriminatory harassment,” and alleges
that other employees who were not from
Sierra Leone or were not perceived as
gay “were not mistreated as [he] was
by Defendant TCA, even though they
all had Patterson as a supervisor.”
Complaints to supervisors allegedly
failed to invoke appropriate measures
against the harasser. As usual in hostile
work environment cases, the court found
that the facts as alleged by Conteh were
not sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to
adversely affect his terms and conditions
of employment, since they focused on
just a few offensive statements, such
as “I don’t like Africans” or “he has
no kids; he must be gay.” In terms of
discrimination claims against DPC,
the court found that because there was
no direct evidence of discriminatory
intent, plaintiff had to satisfy the
McDonnell Douglas test for alleging a
constellation of facts that would support
an inference of discriminatory intent,
one factor of which is alleging that the
plaintiff satisfactorily performed their
job. In this case, although he identified
himself in the complaint as an excellent
employee, the court faulted him for not
citing concrete evidence of satisfactory
job performance. The court also stated
that “he has not alleged facts to show
that defendants undertook any of the
identified adverse employment actions
because of his national origin or
perceived sexual orientation.” As to his
retaliation claim, the court asserted that
“he fails to allege any facts to show that
the deciding officials who undertook
the adverse employment actions at issue
knew of” the complaint he had made
to supervisors, and the judge faulted
plaintiff for not identifying the dates
on which his complaints were made in
order to establish a causal connection
between the complaints and the adverse
employment actions based on temporal
proximity, as there was no other
direct causation evidence. Plaintiff

is represented by Paul V. Bennett, of
Columbia, MD. Judge Griggsby served
on the Court of Claims for several
years by appointment from President
Barack Obama, and was appointed to
the district court last year by President
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
NEW MEXICO – De Anza Angel Dimas
was a high school senior attending
Pecos High School in 2019. She was a
member of the girls’ basketball team,
and she was dating another member
of the team. On January 4, 2019, the
team members got on a bus to go to a
tournament. Before the bus could leave,
the high school’s Athletic Coordinator
asked Dimas and her girlfriend to get
off the bus, then questioned them. Flores
asked Dimas whether she “thought it
was appropriate for her and to be sitting
in the same bus seat with her same-sex
girlfriend.” He told her that “students
involved in dating relationships could
not sit together on the bus or cohabit the
same rooms during overnight trips.” He
then allowed Dimas back on the bus,
where other students asked her “why she
had been taken outside, separated, and
asked to sit elsewhere.” In the ensuing
lawsuit, she claims to was “highly
humiliated, disrespected, and distressed
at being forcibly ‘outed’ before her
teammates and the other students.” She
sent a written complaint against Flores
to school administrators, but the school
superintendent, Fred Trujillo, responded
that it was the school’s policy to separate
students based on dating relationships.
Amidst continuing controversy, the
school abandoned the policy in August
2019, after Dimas had graduated, but
coaches raised the issue with her as the
basketball season continued. She sues
under Title IX, the 14th Amendment, the
New Mexico Constitution and Human
Rights Act, and common law invasion
of privacy against the School District,
the High school, Flores and Trujillo,
initially in state court but removed by
defendants based on the federal claims.
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U.S. District Judge Kea W. Riggs ruled
on motions for judgment on the pleading
by defendants in Dimas v. Pecos
Independent School District Board of
Education, 2022 WL 816501, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48105 (D. N. Mex., March
17, 2022). The court dismissed the Title
IX claims against Flores and Trujillo
because Title IX is only actionable
against educational institutions, not
individuals. The defendants argued
that Title IX does not apply to sexual
orientation discrimination claims, but
by now that ship has sailed. Judge Riggs
noted that even before the Supreme
Court’s Bostock decision in 2020, many
courts had begun to construe Title IX
as extending to sexual orientation and
gender identity discrimination claims,
but Bostock, albeit a Title VII case,
would be followed as a precedent under
Title IX. However, taking literally
the statutory prohibition against
discrimination under Title IX, Judge
Riggs ruled against Dimas on the Title
IX claim “for failure to plausibly plead
the fourth element” of a Title IX claim.
She wrote, “Plaintiff fails to allege,
beyond conclusory statements, any
deprivation of educational benefits or
access.” Thus, her allegations “fall short
of stating a claim under Title IX against
Defendants PISD and Pecos High
School.” As to claims under the New
Mexico Constitution, and the invasion
of privacy claim, the court found that
there was no waiver of state sovereign
immunity from being sued on these
claims in federal court. Under New
Mexico jurisprudence, “a governmental
entity of New Mexico may not be sued
unless the plaintiff’s cause of action
fits within one of the exceptions to the
immunity granted to governmental
entities and public employees” in the
New Mexico Tort Claims Act, which
is strictly construed, so both claims
were dismissed. Her claim under the
New Mexico Human Rights Act was
also dismissed, this time for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The
court held that filing a complaint with the

federal government under Title IX was
not sufficient to exhaust administrative
remedies under the NMHRA, and here
Dimas never filed a complaint with the
NM Human Rights Commission. All
dismissals were with prejudice accept
the NMHRA claims, which can be
refiled if administrative remedies are
first exhausted. Dimas is represented
by Derek V. Garcia, Albuquerque, NM;
and Michelle Garcia, New Mexico
Legal Aid, Santa Fe, NM. Judge Riggs
was appointed by Donald J. Trump.
NEW YORK – In a decision made on
January 10, 2022, but not published
until February 18, 2022 in the NY Law
Journal, N.Y. Supreme Court Justice
Frank Nervo ruled in K.G. v. C.H. (also
sometimes listed as Kelly G. v. Circe
H.), 2022 NYLJ LEXIS 119 (N.Y. Co.)
(apparently not officially published as
of the end of March 2022), that Kelly
G., the former partner of Circe H., is not
entitled to legal recognition as a parent
of A., a child who was adopted by Circe
H. more than a year after the parties had
terminated their relationship. This case
received substantial press attention at
various stages in the litigation, which
has been ongoing since September 1,
2016, when K.G. petitioned the court
for legal standing as a parent of A.,
including custody and visitation. K.G.
did not originally assert an equitable
estoppel claim, instead claiming to
be a parent pursuant to the N.Y. Court
of Appeals’ then-recent opinion in
Brooke SB v. Elizabeth CC, 28 N.Y.3d 1
(2016). Circe maintained throughout the
litigation that Kelly was never a parent of
A., and that in fact when Circe decided
to go ahead with the adoption after the
parties had ceased their relationship,
Kelly had expressly foresworn any
desire to be the legal parent of the child,
although she had contact with A. as a
“friend” or at times “godmother” or
“babysitter.” In K. v. C., 51 N.Y.S. 3d
838 (N.Y. Co., April 11, 2017), Judge
Nervo ruled after an extensive trial

that Kelly had failed to prove that
she and Circe had a plan to adopt and
raise a child together that continued
“unabated” after the termination of
their relationship, and thus that Kelly’s
claim did not come within the secondparent ruling of Brooke S.B. The
Appellate Division affirmed this ruling
in K.G. v. C.H., 79 N.Y.S.3d 166 (N.Y.
App. Div., 1st Dept., June 26, 2018),
but opined that it could not decide the
issue of “whether equitable estoppel
could establish standing of the former
partner, warranting remand to the trial
court.” In K.G. v. C.H., 113 N.Y.S.3d 475
(N.Y. Co., Jan. 18, 2019), Justice Nervo
set out at the request of the parties the
criteria he would use to determine
whether Kelly had standing to seek
custody or visitation on an equitable
estoppel theory. In Kelly G. v. Circe H.,
117 N.Y.S.3d 171 (App. Div., 1st Dep’t,
Dec. 17, 2019), the Appellate Division
rejected Kelly’s objections to some
aspects of Justice Nervo’s equitable
estoppel criteria, and affirmed Justice
Nervo’s award of $200,000 in interim
counsel fees to Circe. There would
be continuing wrangling about fees
as the case progressed, Justice Nervo
eventually embracing the view that
Kelly should bear total responsibility
for the cost of this litigation to Circe.
As summarized in an unpublished order
issued by the court on December 1, 2021,
Kelly’s failure to pay ordered interim
fees led the court to order that she be
fined $2,700,458.09, “representing the
amount of unpaid judgments under the
January 18, 2021, and March 31, 2021
orders, with interest, and $15,000.00 in
respondent’s counsel fees” in bringing
the application for an order of contempt,
and ordering detention if Kelly persisted
in defying the court’s orders regarding
fees. Most recently, as noted in the first
sentence above, Justice Nervo issued
an extensive opinion published in the
NY Law Journal on February 18, 2022,
setting out all the record evidence in
great detail pertinent to the equitable
estoppel theory as applied to this case,
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even though Kelly had moved to abandon
that theory, since she had not agreed
that a dismissal at this point should bar
her from raising the issue in the future.
Justice Nervo opined that finality was
important, and so a full ruling on the
equitable estoppel theory was necessary.
The opinion decisively rejects the
application of equitable estoppel on the
evidentiary record in this case. Those
seeking a full accounting of Justice
Nervo’s determinations on the merits
are referred to his 2017 decision and this
January 10 decision as published in the
NY Law Journal on February 18, which
as of the end of March was available on
Lexis but not on Westlaw. The Appellate
Division has conditionally granted a
stay of Justice Nervo’s December 23,
2021, fee awards, “on condition that
petitioner-appellant perfect the appeal
of the September 2022 Terms of this
Court.” In his January 10 ruling, Justice
Nervo stated that Circe’s counterclaim
for costs and attorney fees was severed,
“and proceedings thereunder shall
continue unabated.” Counsel listed on
the 2017 merits decision were Nancy
Chemtob, of Chemtob, Moss & Forman
LLP, for Kelly, and Bonnie Rabin, of
Cohen Rabin Stine Schumann LLP, for
Circe. Counsel listed on the Appellate
Division decision of 2018, in addition
to those listed for the trial court ruling,
were Roberta A. Kaplan and John C.
Quinn of Kaplan & Co., for Circe, and
Gretchen Beall Schumann, Tim James,
and Lindsay Pfeffer of Cohen Rabin
Stine Schumann LLP for Kelly. Counsel
for Kelly listed on the Appellate
Division’s Dec. 17, 2019, ruling is Eric
Wrubel of Warshaw Burstein LLP,
with Bonnie Rabin of Cohen Rabin
Stine Schumann LLP listed as counsel
for Circe. We thank Justice Nervo
for sending us the slip opinion for his
January 10, 2022, decision, as it had not
come to our attention because Westlaw
has been our primary source for
locating cases of interest in Law Notes,
as a result of which it was not reported
in our March issue.
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NEW YORK – U.S. District Judge Mary
Kay Vyskocil granted the government’s
motion to dismiss Family Equality v.
Becerra, 2022 WL 956256, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 59066 (S.D.N.Y., March 30,
2022), which is a challenge by several
LGBT social service organizations
to
the
Trump
Administration’s
announcement that the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS)
would not enforce provisions of a 2016
Obama Administration rule concerning
non-discrimination in programs funded
by grants from HHS. The Obama
Administration had included “sexual
orientation” and “gender identity”
in the rule as forbidden grounds of
discrimination. The plaintiffs – Family
Equality, True Colors United, Inc.,
and Services & Advocacy for GLBT
Elders (SAGE) – filed suit claiming
that this announcement, titled “Not of
Non-Enforcement,” was in an attempt
to rescind or modify the “2016 Grants
Rule” without going through the
requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and was thus invalid.
After the Biden Administration took
office, Judge Vyskocil received a
letter from the parties “advising that
a pending final rulemaking would
roll back the 2016 Grants Rule,”
mooting this case. This would be as
part of President Biden’s instruction
to all federal agencies to review and
update their discrimination policies,
particularly in light of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in the Bostock case
that policies banning discrimination
because of sex should be interpreted to
ban discrimination because of sexual
orientation or “transgender status.” This
case was stayed in February 2021 in
anticipation of administration action,
but “the proposed new rulemaking was
challenged in a different action” in the
D.C. District Court, Facing Foster Care
in Alaska v. HHS. In that case, defendants
stipulated that the effective date of the
new rulemaking would be extended to
August 2021, so this case was further
stayed. But in subsequent developments,

the D.C. court stayed its case through
April 18, 2022, the purported effective
date of the pending rulemaking. In any
event, Judge Vyskocil decided to grant
the government’s motion to dismiss this
case, not on grounds of mootness but
instead on grounds of standing (an issue
raised by the government initially).
The judge found that the co-plaintiffs
in lacked Article III standing to bring
this case, concluding that they “have
not suffered an involuntary material
burden on established core activities.”
The plaintiffs argued that as a result of
the non-enforcement announcement,
they incurred various expenses in
responding to it, but the judge found
that such expenses did not count for
purposes of establishing individual
standing under Article III, and that
the organizations’ “ability to carry out
responsibilities has not been impeded.”
Plaintiffs are represented by Karen
Loewy, Lambda Legal, Washington,
DC; Kristen Paige Miller, Sean Lev, and
Jeffrey Benjamin Dubner, Democracy
Forward Foundation, Washington, DC;
Robin Thurston and Sasha Buchert,
Washington, DC. Judge Vyskocil
was appointed by President Donald J.
Trump.
NORTH CAROLINA – In Fuenffinger v.
Ecigcharlston, LLC, 2022 WL 951619,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58732 (D.S.C.,
March 30, 2022), Angela Fuenffinger
had filed an EEOC charge against
her employer alleging discrimination
on the “basis of race, color, religious
discrimination,
and
retaliation”
asserting, among other things, a hostile
work environment claim, according
to her amended complaint. But the
complaint’s statement of facts includes
the following: that Plaintiff’s coworker made “negative comments
about homosexuals” and “homophobic
comments about Plaintiff” such as “I
can’t believe you are bisexual.” The
magistrate judge assigned to make
a report and recommendation on a
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motion to dismiss, Judge Molly H.
Cherry, wrote that it was “unclear from
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint whether
the Plaintiff bases her claim on religious
discrimination, racial discrimination,
sexual orientation discrimination, or
some combination thereof.” Wrote the
magistrate judge, in language quoted in
District Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks’
opinion, “Although Plaintiff alleges
in her Amended Complaint that she is
bisexual and that Jayme made offensive
and ‘homophobic’ comments regarding
Plaintiff’s
sexuality,
Plaintiff’s
enumerated causes of action focus on
religion and race and do not mention
sex. Similarly, at the beginning of her
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff omits sex
from her list of the protected classes that
she raised before the EEOC. (emphasis
added by Judge Hendricks). However,
for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss,
viewing the Amended Complaint in
its entirety, the undersigned finds that
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to
allege unwanted conduct based on both
race and sex . . .” Magistrate Cherry
recommended against dismissing a
sex discrimination claim. But Judge
Hendricks wrote, “Where the wellpleaded facts do not permit a court to
infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, then the complaint has
alleged, but has not ‘shown’ that the
pleader is entitled to relief, as required
by Rule 8.” Judge Hendricks expressed
appreciation for “the Magistrate Judge’s
generous view of the Plaintiff’s sloppy
pleading” but was unwilling to follow
the recommendation as to “Amended
Complaint theories of liability that are
only hinted at or partially formed.”
Thus, all that remains of the hostile
environment claim is race, as the
court found that factual allegations
concerning religion were insufficient
as well. Plaintiff’s counsel listed on
the district court’s opinion is Jarrel L.
Wigger of North Charleston, NC, but
there is no indication when attorney
Wigger became involved in the case.
Did Fuenffinger draft the original

complaint pro se? Judge Hendricks was
appointed by President Barack Obama.
OHIO – Reverse discrimination? In
Ames v. State of Ohio Department
of Youth Services, 2022 WL 912256,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56463 (S.D.
Ohio, E.D., March 29, 2022), Chief U.S.
District Court Judge Algenon L. Marbley
granted the former employer’s motion
to dismiss claims of discrimination
because of gender, “sexual preference”
and age brought by Marlean A. Ames, a
“female who identifies as heterosexual
and is over forty years old.” There is no
indication in the slip opinion whether
she is pro se. She had been working at the
Department of Youth Services in various
capacities for almost 30 years when, in
May 2017, an out lesbian was appointed
to be her supervisor. This supervisor
hired a gay man, then 25 years old, as
a social worker, and allegedly finagled
the rules to promote him while he was
still on probation, and this man “began
pushing for Plaintiff’s position,” telling
the supervisor (“in front of plaintiff”)
that Ames should retire. On May 6, 2019,
the supervisor visited Ames at her desk,
and, “after congratulating Ames for 30
years of public service, . . . suggested
that Ames retire” or return to the facility
at which she began her career at DYS.
The supervisor suggested that Ames
apply for the position that the gay man
had just left, which would have involved
a “significant pay reduction,” which
Ames declined to do. A few days later,
Ames was summoned to a meeting with
agency managers, who told her she was
being demoted and transferred. “Ames
fled the room crying,” but eventually
she agreed to sign the paperwork for the
demotion and transfer and was required
to leave the office. Then the agency
hired the gay man to fill the position
from which Ames was demoted. She
claimed he was neither qualified nor had
formally applied for the position. She
later applied for a different managerial
position, but “despite being qualified and

fulfilling the application requirements,”
the agency hired instead another lesbian
to fill that position, who was under age
40. She also noted that she was given a
30-year service certificate, but she was
not given a celebratory party, unlike a
gay man who got a party on his 30-year
service. She claims that all the adverse
and unequal treatment she got was
because of “her heterosexual preference,
gender and age.” Her suit under the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act was dismissed, because the state
enjoys sovereign immunity from ADEA
claims, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). In addition,
all of her supplementary state law
claims were dismissed, on the ground
that the 11th Amendment bars citizens
of a state from suing their state on
state law claims in federal court. Judge
Marbley granted the state’s motion to
dismiss Ames’ Equal Protection Claim
under 42 USC 1983, finding that the
Department of Youth Services is an
“improper defendant,” an issue that
Ames conceded, asking to be allowed
to amend her complaint to sue the
individuals she claims discriminated
against her. “Because the plaintiff
conceded this issue,” wrote the judge,
“the Court will not address whether this
claim would fail for another independent
reason.” Finally, Title VII. Ames was
claiming retaliation in violation of Title
VII, but the court found that she had
failed to allege a necessary element:
that “she was engaging in a protected
activity as defined by that statute” and
that she suffered an adverse personnel
action as a result. “Although Plaintiff
asserts that ‘she advised her supervisors
that demanded her to retire, or take a
lesser position, because of her gender,
age and/or sexual orientation was
discriminatory,’ this allegation only
appears in the Complaint . . . and not
in the factual allegation section. This
is the precise type of ‘legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation’ that this
Court ‘is not bound to accept as true.’”
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Under Title VII, a person who suffers
an adverse personnel action because she
“opposes” unlawful discrimination or
files a Title VII complaint or participates
in a Title VII investigation is protected
from retaliation, but the court was not
buying her argument that her resistance
satisfied the “opposition” element of
the claim. “Although opposition is the
more expansive pathway to satisfy the
protected activity requirement,” wrote
Judge Marbley, “vague resistance, much
like vague charges of discrimination,
do not satisfy this element.” The court
also rejected a hostile work environment
claim, finding insufficient allegations
of actual harassment based on her
sex or sexual orientation. The judge
found that her complaint consisted of
conclusory assertions rather than factual
allegations from which an inference of
discriminatory intent would flow. The
court noted that claims dismissed due
to insufficient factual allegations were
dismissed without prejudice, so she can
try again on those claims that are not
barred by immunity. Judge Marbley was
appointed by President Bill Clinton.
PENNSYLVANIA – Kevin Dorsey,
who resigned from an IT job at
Pennsbury School District, sued the
District, its superintendent, and four
board of education members, claiming
discrimination because of his sexual
orientation and retaliation because he
filed an EEOC complaint. Dorsey v.
Pennsbury School District, 2022 WL
889156, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54300
(E.D. Pa., March 25, 2022). Dorsey
alleges that he did not “conform to
traditionally held gender stereotypes”
and was in a same-sex marriage. He
says one of the individual defendants,
Mr. Gretzula, falsely accused him of
“putting nuts and bolts in his tires,” that
three others had stated at an August
2018 board meeting that employees who
filed EEOC complaints should be fired,
that one board member repeatedly used
the term “faggots” to refer to Dorsey and
34 LGBT Law Notes April 2022

“another person,” and that another board
member, Mr. Kannan, has “baselessly”
accused Dorsey of being a drug dealer
during a school board meeting (of
unspecified date). Dorsey filed charges
with the EEOC and the Pennsylvania
Human Resources Commission on July
25, 2018. (Note: Pennsylvania law does
not explicitly forbid sexual orientation
discrimination; as of that date, the
EEOC had ruled administratively that
sexual orientation complaints were
actionable under Title VII, but federal
appeals courts were divided on the
question and the Supreme Court did
not resolve it in Bostock v. Clayton
County until June 2020.) The District
placed him on administrative leave in
January 2019 “pending an investigation
of allegations” made against him, which
prompted him to quit his job on April
12, 2019. The court dismissed his First
Amended Complaint for failure to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim. He filed
a Second Amended Complaint which,
according to District Judge Gene E.K.
Pratter, “adds sufficient factual matter
to tie each defendant to an alleged
violation framing the various claims,”
the lack of which was evidently one
cause of the earlier dismissal. Since the
district’s motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint focuses again on
pleading deficiencies with regard to
some of the individual defendants,
the court granted a partial motion to
dismiss those claims without prejudice.
Judge Pratter found that Dorsey had not
stated a plausible 42 USC Section 1983
claim against the District itself (a socalled Monell claim), failing to identify
a policy that was discriminatory, and
rejected Dorsey’s argument that the
board members, as policymakers, had
subjected Dorsey to actionable claims
against the district. The court also
found the pleadings insufficient to state
“plausible discrimination or retaliation
claims” against board member Kannan,
or equal protection claims against board
members Toy-Dragoni and Waldorf.
The pleading problem for Dorsey seems

to be that although he believes his
sexual orientation was the reason for
all the nastiness against him, he doesn’t
have any direct evidence for that, and
the allegations he makes against various
individual defendants don’t apparently
“tie in” to his sexual orientation as
a matter of direct evidence. Various
comments by Judge Pratter suggest his
unwillingness to read discriminatory
or retaliatory intent into statements,
in circumstances where somebody
sympathetic to the plaintiff might draw
such inferences. For example, the judge
writes: “Just because Mr. Dorsey filed
an EEOC complaint does not suggest
that any negative remark at a School
Board meeting constitutes retaliation
under Title VII. Because there is no
apparent causal relation between the
‘drug dealer’ remark and Mr. Dorsey’s
gender/sexual orientation or filing of an
EEOC complaint, he has failed to state
a claim against Mr. Kannan under Title
VII.” Also, responding to Dorsey’s First
Amendment retaliation claim, the judge
wrote, “Mr. Dorsey has not alleged
temporal proximity between the ‘drug
dealer’ remark and his filing of an EEOC
complaint. And a single comment does
not establish a pattern of antagonism.”
As to the Board members who said
that people who file EEOC complaints
should be discharged, the judge wrote:
“Mr. Dorsey has provided no argument
that those who file EEOC charges should
themselves be considered a protected
class. Although those who file EEOC
charges are, logically, likely to belong to
protected classes generally, the Supreme
Court has clarified that membership
in a protected class and engaging in a
protected activity are distinct concepts
derived from different types of
substantive claims. Mr. Dorsey alleges
that Ms. Toy-Dragoni and Mr. Waldorf’s
comments discriminated against him on
the basis of gender or sexual orientation,
but the sole allegation he makes against
each defendant with particularity
relates only to a retaliation theory, not
to discrimination based on gender or
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sexual orientation.” Consistent with this
view, the judge dismissed discrimination
claims against these individuals but not
the retaliation claims. The case is still
alive after this opinion, but substantially
reduced, as the court dismissed the 42
USC 1983 claims against the District,
all claims against Mr. Kannan, and
equal protection claims against the
two other board members mentioned
above, but without prejudice as to the
claims against individuals. That leaves
it to his counsel, Mark S. Scheffer of
Birchrunville, PA, to come up with the
necessary pleadings for a third amended
complaint, if one is contemplated before
going forward with what is left of the
case. Judge Pratter was appointed by
President George W. Bush.
PENNSYLVANIA – In Doe v. Shawnee
Holding, Inc., 2022 WL 801503, 2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46042 (M.D. Pa.,
March 15, 2022), a married lesbian
couple is suing the former employer of
one of them on claims of hostile work
environment harassment by a supervisor,
constructive discharge, and retaliation,
as well as a suit under state law against
the harassing supervisor for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (on
behalf of the former employee) and loss
of consortium (on behalf of her spouse).
Ruling on pretrial motions in this
opinion, U.S. Magistrate Judge Joseph F.
Saporito, Jr., denied plaintiffs’ motion to
be allowed to proceed anonymously as
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, and rejected
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
state law claims and require plaintiffs
to submit a more definite statement.
On the anonymity issue, Judge Saporito
reviewed the factors that the 3rd Circuit
set out in Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d
404 (2011) for determining when it is
appropriate to allow plaintiffs to be
anonymous in light of the requirement
in federal law that parties sue under
their own name. The court recognizes
that there may be circumstances where
it is appropriate to allow anonymity, but

they usually involve situations where
proceeding under their own name would
likely case such harm to the plaintiff that
they would be deterred from bringing a
meritorious suit to vindicate their rights.
Judge Saporito concluded that this as
not such a case. The plaintiffs are not
closeted, secretive folk, but rather are
openly married and living together
and holding themselves out as such on
social media. Furthermore, the court
found speculative the contention that
publicity about this case, in light of
the defendant’s significant status in the
community (an Inn and Golf Resort),
could harm the plaintiffs. He also found
it speculative that denying this motion
would cause the plaintiffs to abandon
this case, especially considering his
ruling on the defendants’ motion,
having found that the factual allegations
of the complaint were sufficient to allow
the intentional infliction of emotional
distress and loss of consortium claims to
remain in the case. Part of the plaintiffs’
desire to proceed anonymously had to
do with the emotional distress claim
and the likelihood that mental health
issue and medical records may become
part of the record in the case, but the
court described this as the kind of
emotional distress claim typical of a
sexual harassment case and not having
to do with mental illness or defect.
Defendant’s request for a more definite
statement had to do with its concern
that the complaint did not contain
specific facts it would need to mount a
statute of limitations defense to some
or all of the claimed discrimination,
but the court pointed out that this was
information it could get in discovery. On
the other hand, the court did direct the
plaintiffs to file an amended complaint,
presumably because the complaint they
filed named them as Jane Doe 1 and
Jane Doe 2, and now they have to file
a complaint using their real names.
Plaintiffs are represented by Adrian K.
Cousens, Anne K. Manley, and Jessica
L Harlow, of Gross McGinley, LLP,
Allentown, PA.

PENNSYLVANIA – In Greenberg v.
Goodrich, 2022 WL 874953, 20222
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52881 (E.D. Pa.,
March 24, 2022), U.S. District Judge
Chad F. Kenney ruled that ABA Model
Rule 8.4(g), as adopted in Pennsylvania
by the state’s Supreme Court as part of
the state’s ethical regulation of lawyers,
violates the 1st Amendment free speech
rights of Pennsylvania lawyers by
imposing a content and viewpoint based
restriction on what they can say in their
role as a lawyer, and also violates due
process by using vague language to
describe what is forbidden. The most
recent version of the rule considered by
the court, revised by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in an Order of July
26, 2021, makes it professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: “in the
practice of law, knowingly engage in
conduct constituting harassment or
discrimination based upon race, sex,
gender identity or expression, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, marital status, or
socioeconomic status.” In Comments to
the rule, the practice of law is broadly
defined to include public speaking by
lawyers at CLE programs, conferences,
in bar association activities, etc.
“Harassment” is defined to include
“conduct that is intended to intimidate,
denigrate or show hostility or aversion
toward a person on any of the bases listed
in paragraph (g).” “Discrimination”
is defined to include “conduct that a
lawyer knows manifests an intention: to
treat a person as inferior based on one
or more of the characteristics listed in
paragraph (g).” The plaintiff, Zachary
Greenberg, is a lawyer who does a
fair amount of public speaking, and
to show standing to attack the rule in
federal court, points to instances where
lawyers have been investigated and
threatened with professional discipline
for making controversial remarks on
subjects touching on the grounds listed
in 8.4(g). Judge Kenney concluded that
the rule is content and viewpoint based,
directly regulates speech, and contains
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sufficiently broad and ambiguous
definitions of key terms as to invite
arbitrary enforcement. Furthermore,
finding that strict scrutiny applies
under the 1st Amendment, he finds that
the defenders of the rule have failed to
articulate a compelling interest for such
a burden on freedom of speech, or that
the rule is narrowly tailored to achieve
the high-sounding but vague objectives
specified. While observing that the
ABA as a private organization was
free to ignore the 1st Amendment when
drafting a “model” regulation of lawyer
speech, the Pennsylvania courts as
government actors were not free to do so
when adopting the ABA Model rule as a
binding rule of professional conduct for
the state’s lawyers, potentially subjecting
them to investigation and professional
discipline for violations. He wrote that
“it is not the role of the government
to ensure that all lawyers are noble
guardians of the profession or wellliked by the public. That is equivalent
to requiring that all public school
teachers love children or insisting all
doctors develop a good bedside manner.
Would we prefer that in an ideal world?
Sure. But it is not for the government
to enact regulations that monitor the
type of people who work in a particular
profession. Ultimately, Defendants
want the court to blindly accept antiharassment and anti-discrimination
policy as an overwhelming good that is
justified in and of itself, and the Court
cannot do so without more focus in
the state’s interests for enacting this
particular rule. This nebulous good is
insufficient to serve as a compelling
interest to restrict freedom of speech
and expression.” Judge Kenney was
appointed by President Donald J. Trump.
SOUTH CAROLINA
–
Akiel
McKnight, an African-American man
who identifies as bisexual, lost his job
as a patrol officer with the Pickens
Police Department because he was
soliciting teenage men for sex. In April
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2018, according to the opinion by U.S.
District Judge Joseph Dawson, III, “a
parent complained that Plaintiff was
sending sexual solicitations to underage
males via Snapchat.” When Police Chief
Riggs confronted McKnight with this
complaint, he “admitted sending the
message but maintained that he had
done nothing wrong because the subject
student was at least 16 years old, and
thus had the legal capacity to consent
to sex in South Carolina.” The chief
suspended him for two weeks without
pay. McKnight emailed Interim City
Administrator Harmon challenging
the suspension, and after a meeting
between the three men, it was reduced
to a one-week suspension without pay.
But days later Riggs received a direct
complaint from a parent asking that
McKnight not be allowed around school
children, and the next day the School
District requested that Riggs not allow
McKnight back into the schools while
the District considered the issue further.
Riggs took McKnight off the School
Resource Officer list, suspending
his authorization to work as an SRO,
but put him on suspension with pay
while deciding next steps. On May 30,
Administrator Harmon told McKnight
he was terminated immediately for
“exercising poor judgment as a police
officer and breaching protocol and
the City’s policy and procedure for
the citizen “ride along” programs.
(The opinion doesn’t say how he was
breaching protocol, but one infers that
teenage boys in whom he had an interest
were being invited to ride in his patrol
car.) At any rate, you know how this is
going to turn out. His lawsuit alleges
discrimination in violation of the South
Carolina Human Rights Law, Title
VII, and the Constitution, but Judge
Dawson wasn’t buying it. A magistrate
judge recommended granting summary
judgment to the defendants (the city, the
police department, Chief Riggs, and
Administrator Harmon), and Dawson
agreed. McKnight raised various
objections to the magistrate’s R & R, but

Dawson pointed out that his objections
“failed to address his admission that
he actually sent sexual solicitations
to an underage student,” and that
comments attributed to the mayor and
police commissioner as evidence of
sexual orientation discrimination were
not shown to have anything to do with
the decision by Riggs and Harmon
to dismiss McKnight from the police
force. “Defendants have proffered
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for McKnight’s discharge,” wrote the
judge, “exercising poor judgment as a
police officer, and breaching protocol
and the City’s policy and procedure
for the citizen ‘ride along’ program.
Having reviewed the evidence in the
record and the respective arguments
raised by the parties, McKnight has
not forecasted sufficient evidence of a
pretextual termination.” McKnight v.
Pickens Police Department, 2022 WL
807161, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47614
(D.S.C., March 17, 2022). McKnight
is represented by Helena Lee Ann
Jedziniak and Joshua Thomas Hawkins,
of Hawkins and Jedziniak, Greenville,
SC. Judge Dawson was nominated
by President Donald J. Trump shortly
before the November 2020 election, and
was part of the crop of pending judicial
nominations quickly rushed through the
confirmation process in the Republicancontrolled lame duck Senate session
after the election.
TENNESSEE – In Kilpatrick v. HCA
Human Resources, LLC, 2022 WL
866258, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50801
(M.D. Tenn., March 22, 2022), U.S.
District Judge William L. Campbell,
Jr., granted summary judgment to
the employer on sexual orientation
discrimination and hostile work
environment claims under Title VII
by Montrell Kilpatrick, who was
terminated from his job on March 9,
2016. According to Kilpatrick, the
company first learned that he was gay
in December 2015 when he told this
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to Thomas Beck, the VP of Labor
Relations, in order to “defend against
accusations that he touched female
coworkers inappropriately.” He claims
that Mr. Beck then spread the work
about his sexual orientation to others
in the office, resulting in Kilpatrick
being treated differently than he had
previously been treated. He claimed
that he was inappropriately given a
written warning on errors committed
the previous month that had already
been attended to, that he was subjected
to a variety of harassing comments,
notes, “gifts” (pink nail polish!), and
bath bombs, and that he found notes
on his desk (written on paper from his
director’s notepad) with homophobic
Biblical quotes. When seating was
rearranged, he was assigned a desk
different from the rest of his working
team. Perhaps most significantly, in the
past he had been routinely given tuition
reimbursements for courses he took,
but a new request for reimbursement
submitted after word spread that he was
gay led to questioning, an investigation,
and ultimately his discharge based on his
response to the investigation, in which
he had submitted some documents that
the company claimed had been altered.
Judge Campbell distinguished sharply
between the discrimination claim and
the hostile work environment claim.
He declared that Kilpatrick’s factual
allegations did not meet the “high
bar” set by the 6th Circuit for hostile
environment claims. “At most,” he
wrote, “the gifts and comments on
Plaintiff’s clothing are akin to offensive
utterances. The relocation of his seating
assignment was part of a team-wide
reassignment. Even if Plaintiff were
purposefully placed away from his
teammates, he does not claim that
the relocation made it more difficult
to perform his job. Similarly, the two
disciplinary write-ups (one of which
was removed), are not alleged to have
affected his job responsibilities, pay, or
ability to perform his job. Considering
the totality of the conduct alleged, it

is neither severe enough nor pervasive
enough to create an actionable hostile
work environment.” As to the disparate
treatment claim on his discharge, the
judge faulted Kilpatrick with failing
to allege a non-gay comparator whose
response to an investigation was similar
but who was not dismissed. Kilpatrick
suggested that the comparison should
be between the way he was treated
before he was known to be gay and
afterwards, pointing out that his
tuition reimbursements were routinely
approved before he was known to be
gay, but then triggered an investigation
(including raising questions about
his earlier reimbursements) when he
was known to be gay. Judge Campbell
wasn’t buying this: “The problem with
Plaintiff’s argument is that the conduct
that led to his termination was not
solely that there were ‘discrepancies’
in his reimbursement documentation;
it was that when asked to explain the
discrepancies,
Plaintiff
submitted
obviously manipulated documentation.
In addition, a review of Plaintiff’s
internal email account appeared to show
other altered education documents in
which Plaintiff had altered the account
balance on his student account. There
is no evidence that ‘straight Kilpatrick’
submitted
altered
documents.
Accordingly, he is not an appropriate
comparator.” Kilpatrick is represented
by Constance A. Mann, Franklin, TN.
Judge Campbell was appointed by
President Donald J. Trump.
TEXAS – In Stollings v. Texas Tech
University, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48318 (N.D. Tex., Lubbock Div.,
March 18, 2022), U.S. District Judge
James Wesley Hendrix renders what
he describes as “the latest chapter in
Marlene Stolling’s suit against Texas
Tech and its Athletic Director, Kirby
Hocutt, after she was terminated as head
coach of the women’s basketball team.”
Stollings has filed a series of amended
complaints, leading the court to render a

series of rulings on motions to dismiss.
The overview of Stollings’ allegations
from Judge Hendrix is that due to
controversy about her program, which
led to Title IX issues when several
women resistant to her training methods
sought to transfer out to other programs,
the athletic director “devised a scheme
to salvage his own job by terminating
hers, thereby strategically drawing
blame away from herself. . . Stollings
alleges that her termination was a direct
result of her actions in raising sexualharassment concerns and participating
in the Title IX investigation that brought
negative publicity to Hocutt and the
university” and “that her termination
was also based on Texas Tech’s
‘discriminatory biases against female
and gay and lesbian coaches.’” The
opinion does not describe Stollings as
a lesbian, however, leaving the reader
of the opinion to infer that her claim is
a traditional sex discrimination claim,
not a sexual orientation discrimination
claim. When the dust settles on this
ruling, taken together with rulings
on prior dismissal motions, the court
concludes that Stollings’ allegations are
sufficient to state claims under Title VI
and the Equal Protection Clause, against
the school under Title VII and against
both the school and Hocutt in his official
capacity under 42 USC 1983 (equal
protection). The court found as well
that she “sufficiently pled that Hocutt’s
actions have caused her constitutional
harm.” The only non-monetary
equitable relief that remains in the case
is reinstatement, and the court deems
actual reinstatement as not a viable
remedy under these circumstances,
and rules out for sovereign immunity
purposes claims against Texas Tech
for specific performance of Stollings’
written contract or monetary damages
from the state treasury. Stollings’
counsel include Angelique Weaver of
Mayfield Law Firm LLP, Lubbock;
Joseph Mark Parsons and Tod Mayfield,
of Mayfield Rahlfs Weaber & Parsons
LLP, Amarillo; and Peter R. Ginsberg
April 2022 LGBT Law Notes 37

CIVIL LITIGATION notes
of Moskowitz & Book LLP, New
York. Judge Hendrix was appointed by
President Donald J. Trump. [Had this
case involved a direct sexual orientation
claim, we would have provided a more
detailed exposition of the factual
allegations. As to Stollings’ complaint
about the treatment of gay and lesbian
staff, Judge Hendrix found that she “has
not alleged the requisite elements to seek
to vindicate the third-party rights of
current female, gay, or lesbian coaches,
staff, and others of Texas Tech.”]
TEXAS – U.S. District Judge Drew B.
Tipton granted summary judgment
to the employer in Graham v. City of
Port Lavaca, Texas, 2022 WL 991998,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60614 (S.D.
Texas, March 31, 2022), in which former
police officer Rusty Graham claimed
discrimination, retaliation and hostile
work environment because of his sexual
orientation. Judge Tipton found that the
employer had legitimate, non-pretextual
reasons for forcing Graham to resign
(or Graham would be discharged), and
the Police Chief and Lieutenant both
claimed they did not know Graham was
gay until he filed his discrimination
charge after resigning. Graham, on the
other hand, contended that everything
had been going fine for him – good
job rating, pay increases – until the
Chief asked him who was riding along
with him in his patrol car and Graham
identified the man as Jesse Villareal, his
“boyfriend.” The defendants claim that
Graham had violated a rule requiring
a security check of anybody allowed
to ride along in a police car, and that a
subsequent check they ran on Villareal
revealed an arrest record. The Chief
also claims that Graham referred
to Villareal as a “friend,” not as his
“boyfriend.” Graham also complained
that an application he put in for an
open detective position was denied
him because he was gay, while the
defendants countered that he ranked 4th
out of 6 applicants from the interview
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process for the position, with the
person promoted having scored above
him. There was also documentation of
his falsifying time records, claiming
overtime pay he hadn’t earned, as the
video records documented discrepancies
about the times he was checking in and
the written records. All of these factors
taken together convinced Judge Tipton
that there was no need for a jury to do
any fact-finding in this case; it could be
decided as a matter of law in favor of
the defendants on all claims. Graham
alleged that after he told the Chief that the
ride-along passenger was his boyfriend,
“the Department’s tone toward him
‘abruptly changed’” and he was “treated
differently, issued disciplinary actions,
not selected for an open detective
position, and effectively terminated”
because of his sexual orientation.
In the absence of direct evidence of
discriminatory intent, the court applied
the McDonnell Douglas allocation
of proof, finding that the key element
was Graham’s failure to show that the
reasons articulated by the Department
for forcing him out were “pretexts” for
sexual orientation discrimination. His
retaliation charge disintegrated because
he was unable to show he had engaged
in protected conduct as defined in Title
VII, and the hostile environment claim
disappeared, partly perhaps because
the court believed the Chief’s claim
that they didn’t know Graham was
gay until he filed his charge, but more
heavily because the kinds of slights he
mentioned fall short of the high bar set
for finding a hostile work environment.
Graham is represented by Robert J Heil,
III, Corpus Christi, TX. Judge Tipton
was appointed by President Donald J.
Trump in 2020.
VIRGINIA – U.S. District Judge
Elizabeth K. Dillon granted motions to
dismiss Alyssa Reid’s lawsuit against
her former employer, James Madison
University, and the U.S. Department
of Education, complaining of how

the University handled disciplinary
proceedings against her pursuant to
its Title IX administrative process
as influenced by DoE. Reid v. James
Madison University, 2022 WL 909845,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56858 (W.D. Va.,
March 29, 2022). The court found that
Reid waited too long to file suit against
the University, and lacked standing to
sue the U.S. Department of Education.
Reid, an administrator at the University,
was involved in a romantic relationship
with a female graduate student who
had been assigned to the University’s
“Individual Events Team” at a time
when Reid was the Assistant Director
of Individual Events. Reid alleges that
the graduate student, Kathryn Lese,
had initiated the relationship, boasting
to that effect to others. After Lese
graduated from her academic program,
she was hired as a full-time University
employee. Subsequently, Reid and Lese
moved in together and continued their
relationship for over 27 months until they
broke up in January 2018. In May 2016
“someone lodged an anonymous Title
IX allegation against Reid regarding the
relationship.” At the time, the Title IX
officer who investigated the complaint
“concluded that the environment on the
team was not problematic” and Reid’s
Department chair “informed her that
there were no problems associated
with her personal relationship with
Lese because she was not Lese’s direct
supervisor. Lese was upset that someone
had challenged the propriety of their
relationship, stating that it was none of
the University’s business,” wrote Judge
Dillon, citing the Complaint. When the
relationship ended, “Lese did not take
the break-up well and began stalking
Reid” in various ways, Reid claims.
But it was Lese who sent an email to
the Title IX coordinator in December
2018, attaching an unsigned, undated
“Title IX Statement” claiming that she
was a victim of sexual misconduct by
Reid in the form of a “nonconsensual
relationship.” This set into motion the
University’s Title IX process, which
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it appears was frequently revised in
response to changing signals from the
Obama Administration and then the
Trump Administration about how Title
IX sexual misconduct claims were to
be investigated and determined. The
Obama guidelines were intended to
make it less difficult to hold people
accountable for sexual misconduct,
while the Trump guidelines were
intended to provide make it more
difficult to determine accountability,
tinkering with the investigative and
hearing procedures and the standard
of proof. The various guidelines
embraced varying views on whether
relationship between students and
University employees could be deemed
“consensual” or “nonconsensual.” In
any event, the procedure culminated in
Reid being issued a letter of reprimand
on recommendation of a Title IX
committee, which decided that she
had engaged in a nonconsensual
relationship with a graduate student, and
determination to accept the committee’s
findings by a dean and left in place by
the provost. Reid ended up resigning
from the University, then eventually
filing this lawsuit claiming violations
of Title IX by the University and of
the constitution and Administrative
Procedure Act by the Department of
Education. Judge Dillon determined that
the claims against the University were
time-barred, rejected Reid’s contention
that the clock didn’t start to run until
the final internal University appeal of
the decision was denied, and that Reid
lacked standing to sue the Education
Department under the APA, since the
agency guidance she was challenging
had been superseded by the time her
case was decided by the committee
and the appellate administrators. The
opinion goes into great detail about both
the Title IX process at JMU and the
various communications sent by DoE
to educational institutions influencing
their Title IX enforcement policies. Reid
is represented by Harriet Hageman and
John Julian Vecchione, of New Civil

Liberties Alliance, Washington, DC.
Judge Dillon was appointed by President
Barack Obama.
VIRGINIA – Being a member of a
“protected class” does not guarantee
being retained in a job if you don’t do the
job. That is a lesson one can draw from
Sarco v. 5 Start Financial, LLC (d/b/a
Armed Forces Benefit Association),
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54105, 2022 WL
883936 (W.D. Va., March 24, 2022).
Joshua Sarco worked as a customer
service representative for AFBA
beginning in August 2015. AFBA has an
anti-discrimination policy that includes
sexual orientation. Nonetheless, Sarco
perceived that some co-workers were
prejudiced against LGBT people, based
on remarks they made and their religious
views. Sarco’s first work evaluation
after being hired was stellar, but based
on the court’s narration of the alleged
facts in this case, Sarco’s performance
ran downhill after that first evaluation,
mainly because of his temptation to
spend a lot of worktime on youtube.
com, his frequent vaping breaks in the
restroom (with vaping there violating a
company rule), and his below average
volume of customer telephone calls.
The opinion by District Judge Michael
Urbanski goes into chapter and verse
about the increasing impatience of
his supervisors with Sarco’s failure to
improve his workplace conduct despite
his assurances he would do so after
repeated counseling. They document a
rising volume of customer complaints
about their dealings with Mr. Sarco,
until finally he was let go. Sarco
alleged violation of Title VII and hostile
work environment. The hostile work
environment claim was apparently so
thin that it was dismissed with prejudice
earlier. His remaining discrimination
claims sound good in isolation based
on his claims about co-worker behavior
until you read the employer’s description
of the problems with Sarco’s office work
habits. Sarco summoned in support

of his complaint various incidents of
comments he construed as homophobic
or indications about the religiosity of
certain supervisors, but to no avail,
as Judge Urbanski granted summary
judgement to the employer on both
discrimination and hostile environment
counts, the judge concluding that
“even if Sarco established prima facie
discrimination, AFBA has met its
burden of showing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing Sarco.
Sarco’s work performance was not
satisfactory and did not sufficiently
improve despite many counseling
sessions and discussions.” As to
evidence of discriminatory intent, the
judge pointed out, “In fact, when it
hired him, his supervisors were aware
that he was gay.” The court related an
incident when an employee reported
to management about a tenant in an
office directly above hers making loud
homophobic comments about Sarco, and
two supervisors visited the tenant and
“demanded that all of their employees
be treated with respect regardless of
their sexual orientation. They asked
the tenant to stop talking badly about
Sarco with his customers.” Finding
that a reasonable juror could not reach
a conclusion that sexual orientation
discrimination was a pretext for Sarco’s
termination, the court granted summary
judgment to the employer. Sarco is
represented by Nicholas A. Hurston,
Staunton, VA. Judge Urbanski was
appointed by President Barack Obama.
WASHINGTON – Kimberley J. Davis
was employed as a special education
teacher in the Port Angeles School
District until she was terminated
in February 2020. She claimed
discrimination and retaliation because
of her sexual orientation, invoking
federal Title VII and the Washington
Law Against Discrimination. Davis v.
Port Angeles School District, 2022 WL
602171, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36026
(W.D. Wash., March 1, 2022). Senior
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U.S. District Judge Benjamin H. Settle,
ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment regarding a Report &
Recommendation issued by Magistrate
Judge S. Kate Vaughan, basically adopted
the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that
summary judgment should be granted
to the employer regarding dismissing
the discrimination claim with prejudice
but allowing the retaliation claim to
continue, but narrowed to the issue
of negative job references given to
potential employers. Davis had very
good teaching evaluations for her first
several years, but things went south
after a student reported to the school
having seen Davis kiss another woman
in the parking lot, leading to remarks
and subsequent conduct by the school
principal that Davis construed as
hostile to her because of her sexual
orientation. Subsequently a dispute
arose concerning the alleged failure of
Davis to follow a new curriculum that
the district had adopted for the classes
she was teaching, followed by claims
that she had altered various documents
used in connection with that curriculum
to make it look like she was complying.
Although the Superintendent of Public
Instruction concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to show that Davis
had violated professional conduct rules
by altering “student records,” she was
nonetheless terminated. The magistrate
concluded that her discrimination claim
was unsupported, since the District’s
reason for dismissing her, tied to lower
teaching evaluations and the curriculum
dispute, was not pretextual, but that there
was enough evidence to rejected the
employer’s bid for summary judgment
on that portion of her retaliation claim
that had to do with adverse references
given by a district official in response
to telephone inquiries from other
school to which she had applied. Judge
Settle ruled that a trial was needed on
the narrowed retaliation claim, after
rejecting Davis’s argument that the
retaliation claim should not have been
narrowed to focus only on the issue of
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job references. Settle found that Davis
had not presented evidence that would
support a broader retaliation claim.
Davis is represented by Daniel Charles
Gallagher, of Bainbridge Island, WA,
and Deborah Ann Boe, of Seabeck, WA.
Judge Settle was appointed by President
George W. Bush.
WEST VIRGINIA – In Hersom v.
Crouch, 2022 WL 908503, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56842 (S.D. W. Va.,
March 28, 2022), Chief District Judge
Joseph R. Goodwin granted a motion
by a transgender co-plaintiff in a
case challenging how West Virginia
handles requests for substitute birth
certificates from people who undertake
gender transition to be able to proceed
anonymously. As described in the
opinion, it seems that West Virginia is
unwilling to provide a substitute birth
certificate that does not reveal the gender
transition. If the individual has changed
their name, West Virginia will issue a
certificate that shows the original name
crossed off with the new name written in
its place, and the certificate will reveal
to anybody to whom it is shown that
the person is transgender. “A person’s
transgender status is a highly sensitive
and personal matter,” wrote Judge
Goodwin, “and revealing it can subject
them to mental and physical harm. Mr.
Doe has agreed to reveal his identity
to Defendants in this case to avoid any
prejudice. Because Mr. Doe’s anonymity
in this case will not prejudice Defendants
and revealing his transgender status
will subject him to substantial risk of
mental and physical harm, his motion
to proceed anonymously is granted.”
The opinion reviews 4th Circuit case
law on factors courts should consider
in deciding whether to allow a party to
proceed anonymously, and concludes
that the factors cumulatively weigh in
favor of granting the motion. “The very
nature of this action concerns the ability
of transgender West Virginians to be
able to control the situations in which

they reveal their transgender status,”
wrote the judge. “To deny anonymity
to Mr. Doe would deny him the remedy
he seeks without ever reaching the
merits of the case.” Interestingly, the
other co-plaintiff, Xavier Hersom,
does not seek to be anonymous. The
plaintiffs are represented by a civil
rights lawyers: Xavier Hersom, and,
John Doe, Plaintiffs: Alexander Chen,
Legal Services Center of Harvard Law
School; Loree Beth Stark, and Nicholas
Ward, ACLU of West Virginia; Malita
Vencienzo Picasso and Meredith Taylor
Brown, ACLU, New York. Judge
Goodwin was appointed by President
Bill Clinton.
WEST VIRGINIA – In Kerr v. McKay,
2022 WL 985869, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60032 (S.D. W. Va., March
31, 2022), Senior U.S. District Judge
John T. Copenhaver, Jr., accepted a
recommendation by Magistrate Judge
Dwane L. Tinsley to grant summary
judgment in favor of all defendants in
Lisa Marie Kerr’s claims against the
West Virginia Department of Health
and Human Resources under Title
VII and against DHHR and two of its
supervisors on supplementary state law
defamation claims. Kerr, a social worker
employed by DHHR, is also a member
of the bar and represented herself.
Thus it is surprising that in responding
to Magistrate Tinsley’s opinion, she
filed objections that Judge Copenhaver
criticizes as attempting to “relitigate
the entire matter as though it had not
been the subject of the magistrate
judge’s review” by essentially making
the same arguments she had made in
opposition to the defendants’ motions
for summary judgement rather than
focusing on specific objections to the
magistrate’s proposed findings of facts
and recommendations, and objecting to
the magistrate judge’s refusal to admit
in evidence a lengthy affidavit Kerr had
prepared and submitted after discovery
in the case was closed. In light of these

